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Collapse of a Co-operation: the Chinese View of the Sino-




The Sino-American relations underwent some crucial changes during the 
presidency of George Herbert Walker Bush (January 20 1989 – January 20 1993). 
The ŶeǁlǇ eleĐted pƌesideŶt ǁas gƌeeted as aŶ ͛old fƌieŶd͛ ďǇ the leadeƌs of the 
Chinese Communist Party, who  put his belief in making the relationship between 
the two countries more intense. Still, by the end of the Bush era, trust between 
the two countries had already got to such a low level that had not been 
experienced since the normalization of 1972. The aim of the present study is to 
examine the changes which made the Chinese supervise their foreign policy 
continuously and re-evaluate the new international situation from the view of the 
Chinese government. 
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Sino-American relations before the Bush presidency  
 
With the pƌoĐlaŵatioŶ of the People͛s ‘epuďliĐ of ChiŶa ;P‘CͿ OĐtoďeƌ ϭ iŶ 
1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) finished the Chinese Civil War as a 
winner. The United States of America (USA) was unwilling to acknowledge the CCP 
as the legitimate leader. The relationship between the two countries worsened 
due to the Korean War (1950-1953) and they became enemies. However, the 
considerably deteriorating Sino-Soviet relation in the 1960s encouraged the 
leaders of the USA to re-think its China-policy. Richard Nixon considered China as a 
poteŶtial paƌtŶeƌ, ǁho Đould help to ƌeďalaŶĐe the Soǀiet UŶioŶ. NiǆoŶ͛s histoƌiĐ 
visit took place between February 21 and 28, 1972. Although the relationship 
between the two countries was settled de jure in 1979 and despite some 
difficulties it was becoming closer and closer with deepening trust.  
With the presidency of George H. W. Bush it seemed the Sino-American 
relations would improve further since as opposed to the earlier American 
presidents, he possessed a significant amount of experience about China. Bush, as 
the head of the United States Liaison Office (USLO), which was the unofficial 
representative office of the United States between September 26 1974 – January 
20 19751, and as Vice President had visited China several times contributing to the 
improvement of the relationship between the two countries, which was especially 
appreciated by the Chinese leadership and he maintained a personal relationship 
                                                 
1 About this period see: BUSH, George H. W. & ENGEL, Jeffrey A. (ed): The China diary of George H. 
W. Bush: the making of a global president, Princeton University Press, USA, 2008.  
 
 




with some important Chinese leaders2. The condition of deepening the Sino-
American relation was that the efforts of the American government should match 
the foreign policy plans of the CCP. It was Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader of 
the CCP who significantly determined the Chinese foreign policy after Mao 
ZedoŶg͛s death. 
 
Deng Xiaoping’s foreign poliĐy ĐonĐept 
 
The era characterised by Deng meant a turning-poiŶt Đoŵpaƌed to Mao͛s 
foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ. Mao͛s ideas ǁeƌe deteƌŵiŶed ďǇ the pƌepaƌatioŶ foƌ a thiƌd ǁoƌld 
war, while Deng brought this view to an end. „We used to believe that war was 
iŶeǀitaďle aŶd iŵŵiŶeŶt. ;…Ϳ IŶ shoƌt, afteƌ aŶalysiŶg the geŶeƌal tƌeŶds iŶ the 
world and the environment around us, we have changed our view that the danger 
of ǁaƌ is iŵŵiŶeŶt”3. DeŶg ďased ChiŶa͛s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ oŶ a Ŷeǁ foundation and 
set a new main goal instead of simply surviving a world war and bringing 
ĐoŵŵuŶisŵ to a gloďal ǀiĐtoƌǇ. This Ŷeǁ goal ǁas to ƌegaiŶ ChiŶa͛s ƌole as a gƌeat 
power, which was lost more than a century ago in the Opium wars (1838-42, 1858-
60). The desire to restore its role as a great power was not a new phenomenon in 
Chinese history. The reforms of the late imperial period, the May 4th movement, 
the aspiration of the Kuomintang (Guomindang) to reunite the country and even in 
the policy of the Sino-Soviet slip, the ͛Gƌeat Leap Foƌǁaƌd͛ this aim was present. 
PaƌadoǆiĐallǇ, it ǁas its eaƌlieƌ eŶeŵǇ, the USA, ǁhiĐh ƌestoƌed ChiŶa͛s gƌeat 
poǁeƌ status to soŵe eǆteŶt. NiǆoŶ͛s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ ĐoŶĐept ǁith keepiŶg the 
ŶatioŶal iŶteƌests͛ of AŵeƌiĐa iŶ fƌoŶt of his eyes, provided a great power status 
for China – at least on the level of rhetoric. 
As opposed to Mao, Deng had a more realistic view about the great power 
status of his country: „People around the world are talking about the big triangle 
composed of the Soviet Union, the United States and China. We don't put it that 
way, because we have a sober estiŵate of ouƌ oǁŶ stƌeŶgth”4. Deng saw the 
ambiguous feature of China as a great power: „China is a major country as well as 
a minor one. By major I mean that it has a huge population and a vast territory, 
aŶd ďy ŵiŶoƌ I ŵeaŶ that it is still a ƌelatiǀely pooƌ, deǀelopiŶg ĐouŶtƌy”5. In his 
                                                 
2 Memoranda of face-to-face conversation: PƌesideŶt Bush͛s MeetiŶg ǁith PƌesideŶt YaŶg 
ShaŶgkuŶ of the People͛s ‘epuďliĐ of ChiŶa, February 25, 1989. George Bush Presidential Library and 
Museum (GBPLM) http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1989-02-25-Shangkun 
%20.pdf. (14. 07. 2013) 
3 DENG: Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China, June 4, 1985. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (SWDX), 3. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1410.html (16. 07. 2013).  
4 DENG, Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China, June 4, 1985. SWDX ,3. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/ 
text/c1410.html (16. 07. 2013). 
5 DENG: We Must follow Our Road in economic development as we did in revolution, October, 26. 
1984. SWDX, 3. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1290.html (16. 07. 2013) 
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opinion China could only turn into a great power through economic and technical 
development. Deng set the task in the following way: „Modernization is at the core 
of all ;…Ϳ ŵajoƌ tasks, ďeĐause it is the esseŶtial ĐoŶditioŶ foƌ solǀiŶg ďoth ouƌ 
domestic and our external problems. Everything depends on our doing the work in 
our own country well. The role we play in international affairs is determined by the 
extent of our economic growth. If our country becomes more developed and 
pƌospeƌous, ǁe ǁill ďe iŶ a positioŶ to play a gƌeateƌ ƌole iŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal affaiƌs”6. 
DeŶg kŶeǁ that it ǁould ďe a loŶg ǁaǇ to ChiŶa͛s ŵodeƌŶization (even 50-70 
years7) and the help of the foreign states in the possession of developed 
technology would be necessary. The ͛‘efoƌŵ aŶd OpeŶiŶg up͛ policy proclaimed in 
1978 demanded exactly this goal8. However, it demanded the international 
relations be based on new foundations. He gave up spreading the revolutionary 
ideologies typical of the Mao era and also deciding on foreign relations on 
ideological basis. Rather, China had to make practical and independent foreign 
policy: „We adhere to an independent foreign policy of peace and do not join any 
ďloĐ. We aƌe pƌepaƌed to ŵaiŶtaiŶ ĐoŶtaĐts aŶd ŵake fƌieŶds ǁith eǀeƌyoŶe”9. This 
view determined its relationship with the USA and the USSR. Deng considered the 
relationship with the USA extremely important since it could be a long-term source 
of technology and capital. Still, he did not look at the USA as an ally. The Sino-
Vietnamese War (1979) serves as an evidence of this because Deng informed the 
US about his intentions but acted independently10.  
As opposed to the Mao era, China was trying to maintain a good relationship 
with every country, which still had a condition: none of the states had the right to 
iŶteƌfeƌeŶĐe iŶto ChiŶa͛s doŵestiĐ affaiƌs. It ǁas a ǀeƌǇ seŶsitiǀe issue siŶĐe 
according to China, its loss as a great power and its long-lasting domestic problems 
were related to the intervention of the west. With the proclamation of the 
People͛s ‘epuďliĐ of ChiŶa iŶ ϭϵ4ϵ ChiŶa͛s huŵiliatioŶ eŶded aŶd ǁas folloǁed ďǇ 
nationalisation of foreign property and the fled of foreigners. However, fear for 
foreign intervention did not disappear, which heavily loaded the relationship with 
the USSR. Deng inherited this view: „China will not play the card of another 
country and will not allow another country to play the China card, and we mean 
ǁhat ǁe say”11. Deng was afraid that a foreign intervention would bring a political 
                                                 
6 DENG: The present situation and the tasks before us, January 16, 1980, SWDX, 2. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1390.html (16. 07. 2013) 
7 DENG: We must safeguard world peace and ensure domestic development, May 29, 1984., SWDX, 
3. http://web.peopledaily.com.cn/english/dengxp/vol3/text/c1200.html (16. 07. 2013) 
8 The generally accepted starting date of the „‘efoƌŵ aŶd OpeŶiŶg Up” policy is third plenum of 
11th Central Committee of the CCP, held in Beijing, from18 December to 22 December 1978. 
9 DENG: For the great unity of the entire Chinese nation, June 18, 1986, SWDX, 3. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1530.html (16. 07. 2013). 
10 About this see the conversation of Deng and the James E. Carter in Washington, 29 January 1979. 
205. Memorandum of Conversation in: NICKLES, David P. (eds): Foreign Relations of the United States 
1970-1980. China. 13. United States Government Printing Office Washington, 2013. 
11 DENG: Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China, June 4, 1985. SWDX, 3. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/ 
 
 




tuƌŶ, ǁhiĐh ǁould hiŶdeƌ the ƌestoƌatioŶ of ChiŶa͛s positioŶ as a gƌeat poǁeƌ. He 
found the western countries and the western democratic political structure 
eǆtƌeŵelǇ daŶgeƌous, that͛s ǁhǇ he aŶŶouŶĐed that ŵodeƌŶizatioŶ is Ŷot eƋual 
with the westernisation of China: „we cannot copy Western systems. If we did, that 
would only make a mess of everything. Our socialist construction can only be 
carried out under leadership, in an orderly way and in an environment of stability 
aŶd uŶity. ;…Ϳ Bouƌgeois liďeƌalizatioŶ ǁould pluŶge the ĐouŶtƌy iŶto tuƌŵoil oŶĐe 
ŵoƌe.”12 It is not surprising that according to Deng the most important principle in 
international relations was The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence13, whose 
fourth point says that states have to refrain from intervening into other countries 
domestic affairs14. 
Last but not least, the foreign policy of Deng has another important feature, 
namely, he thought that his country did not have to give up active foreign policy 
despite its teŵpoƌaƌǇ ǁeakŶess. IŶ DeŶg͛s ǀieǁ ChiŶa is the ŵaiŶ ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe of 
the Third World which can primarily play its role within the frame of the United 
Nations: „It is one of the permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council. Its vote definitely represents the Third World, the underdeveloped 
countries. We have said more than once that China belongs to the Third World"15. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, he eŵphasises that ChiŶa͛s leadiŶg ƌole is basically different from that of 
the US and USSR within their own block since it ensures its own position not by 
ŵeaŶs of poǁeƌ aŶd ͛hegeŵoŶǇ͛: „China shall always belong to the Third World 
and shall never seek hegemony16”, but rather by setting a good example and goals 
with responsibility: „We are fair in our words and in our deeds. This adds to China's 
political influence. This policy has produced good results, and we shall follow it 
foƌeǀeƌ”. 17 
To suŵ up, DeŶg͛s ŵaiŶ aiŵ ǁas to ƌestoƌe his ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s great power position. 
Accordingly, the foreign policy tasks were to ensure a peaceful international 
environment and to open up more widely but without any foreign intervention 
into domestic affairs. The basis of his active foreign policy was the representation 
of the Third World on the international stage. Still as we will see, the feasibility and 
ƌealitǇ of DeŶg͛s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ ĐoŶĐept laƌgelǇ depeŶded oŶ the ideas aŶd foƌeigŶ 
policy goals of the leadership of the USA.  
 
                                                                                                                  
vol3/text/c1410.html (16. 07. 2013). 
12 DENG: Take a clear-cut stand against bourgeois liberalization, December 30, 1986, SWDX, 3. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1630.html (16. 07. 2013). 
13 See: VANG, Pobzeb: Five Principles of Chinese Foreign Policies, AuthorHouse, USA, 2008.  
14 DENG: The principles of peaceful coexistence have a potentially wide application, October 31, 
1984, SWDX, 3. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1300.html (16. 07. 2013). 
15 DENG: We Must follow Our Road in economic development as we did in revolution, October, 26. 
1984. SWDX, 3. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1290.html (16. 07. 2013). 
16 DENG: Realize the Four Modernizations and Never Seek Hegemony, May 7, 1978. SWDX, 2. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1200.html (16. 07. 2013). 
17 DENG: For the great unity of the entire Chinese nation, June 18, 1986. SWDX, 3. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1530.html (16. 07. 2013). 
 
 
ÖT KONTINENS, az Új- és JeleŶkoƌi EgǇeteŵes TöƌtéŶeti TaŶszék tudoŵáŶǇos közleŵéŶǇei, No 2013/1. 
ELTE, BUDAPEST, 2014. 
 
203 
Bush’s Chinese ǀisit in Feďruary: the period of harmonic co-operation 
 
PƌesideŶt Bush͛s dediĐatioŶ to ChiŶese ƌelatioŶs ǁas ƌefleĐted ďǇ the faĐt that 
after taking up his post, he started planning his visit the Beijing immediately since he 
ǁaŶted to ŵeet DeŶg ďefoƌe Mikhail GoƌďaĐheǀ͛s ǀisit there. In his speech in 
Vladivostok Gorbachev had some generous gestures towards China (he made a 
promise to withdraw from Afghanistan, to de-militarise the shared border line and to 
suspend the support of Vietnam), which met the requirements China set in order to 
settle the relationship between the two sister parties18. From the view of US it 
seemed dangerous that the Soviet Union and China were getting closer to each 
otheƌ, that͛s ǁhǇ the Bush-government wanted to take steps as soon as possible. It 
was the funeral of the Japanese emperor Hirohito February 24, which gave the 
opportunity as the president of the US was present19. Bush arrived in Beijing the 
following day, where he was greeted with great respect, met the most important 
leaders such as Li Peng20, Yang Shangkun21, Zhao Ziyang22 and Deng Xiaoping23.  
The Chinese leadership, realising the American worries, calmed Bush that 
irrespective of the results of the meetings, the Russian-Chinese alliance of the 
1950s would not be restored. They promised to improve in the fields the 
Americans found arguable such as the foreign trade deficit, protection of 
intellectual properties and trading Chinese missiles24. The Chinese leadership 
aŶŶouŶĐed that gettiŶg Đloseƌ to the US as ǁell as to the USS‘ suits ChiŶa͛s loŶg-
term strengthening in the field of the economy. According to the Chinese leaders 
                                                 
18 DENG: Replies of the American TV Correspondent Mike Wallace, September 2, 1986. SWDX, 3. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1560.html (16. 07. 2013). 
19 U.S. Embassy Beijing Cable: The President's Visit to China: Suggestions Regarding What We and 
the Chinese Hope to Accomplish, February 6, 1989, IN: EVANS, Michael L. (eds.) The U.S. „Tiananmen 
Papers” New Documents Reveal U.S. Perceptions of 1989 Chinese Political Crisis, National Security 
Archive Electronic Briefing Book. 47., 2001. EVANS (2001): http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ 
NSAEBB47/doc1.pdf . 
20 Memoranda of face-to-face conversation: PƌesideŶt Bush͛s Informal Tea with Premier Li Peng, of the 
State CouŶĐil of the People͛s ‘epuďliĐ of ChiŶa, February 25, 1985. Doc. Number: 8859 GBPLM 
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1989-02-25--Peng.pdf. (18. 07. 2013) and: 
Memoranda of face-to-face conversation: PƌesideŶt Bush͛s MeetiŶg ǁith Pƌeŵieƌ Li PeŶg of the People͛s 
Republic of China, February 26, 1989. Doc. Number: 8860 GBPLM http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/ 
research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1989-02-26--Peng.pdf (18. 07. 2013). 
21 Memoranda of face-to-face conversation: PƌesideŶt Bush͛s MeetiŶg ǁith PƌesideŶt Yang 
ShaŶgkuŶ of the People͛s ‘epuďliĐ of ChiŶa, February 25, 1989. GBPLM http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/ 
research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1989-02-25--Shangkun%20[1].pdf (18. 07. 2013). 
22 Memoranda of face-to-face conversation: PƌesideŶt Bush͛s MeetiŶg ǁith GeŶeƌal SeĐƌetaƌy of the 
CeŶtƌal Coŵŵittee of the CoŵŵuŶist Paƌty )hao )iyaŶg of the People͛s ‘epuďliĐ of ChiŶa, February 26, 
1989. GBPLM http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1989-02-26--Ziyang.pdf 
23 Memoranda of face-to-face conversation: PƌesideŶt Bush͛s MeetiŶg ǁith DeŶg XiaopiŶg of the 
People͛s ‘epuďliĐ of ChiŶa, February 26, 1989. GBPLM http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/ 
memcons_telcons/1989-02-26--Xiaoping.pdf (18. 07. 2013). 
24 U.S. Embassy Beijing Cable, The President's Visit to China: Suggestions Regarding What We and 
the Chinese Hope to Accomplish, February 6, 1989, IN: EVANS (2001): http://www.gwu.edu/ 
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB47/doc1.pdf (18. 07. 2013). 
 
 




in order to achieve this, peaceful environment was needed and also the foreign 
states should refrain from interfering into their domestic affairs. Yang and Zhao 
cautiously warned the US not to make this mistake and not to interference into 
ChiŶa͛s doŵestiĐ issues. TheǇ also Đlaiŵed that the ͚OpeŶiŶg Up poliĐǇ͛ did Ŷot 
mean copying the western political system25.  
The warning must be in connection with the case of Fang Lizhi. On 28th 
February Bush held a reception for his host at the Great Wall Sheraton Hotel with 
about 500 guests. The list was put together by the embassy, as a result of which 
ambassador Winston Lord, an ardent supporter of human rights, invited Fang, the 
astrophysical. He was considered as one of the most important member of the 
opposition since he openly shared his view on the western-type of political 
transition, because of which he was excluded from the CCP in 198726. The Chinese 
paƌtǇ opposed to FaŶg͛s iŶǀitation but the invitation cards had already been sent 
so the situation could not be resolved without the loss of face of one of the 
parties. In the end the Chinese authorities held Fang up and did not let him in the 
banquet. Because of the incident the Bush government expressed its 
dissatisfaĐtioŶ ǁith Loƌd, ǁhiĐh ƌefleĐted the AŵeƌiĐaŶs͛ ƌefƌaiŶ fƌoŵ iŶteƌǀeŶiŶg 
into Chinese domestic affairs27.  
The Bush-ŵeetiŶg had iŵpoƌtaŶĐe fƌoŵ the ChiŶese leadeƌship͛ ǀieǁ, ďeĐause 
it created an opportunity to introduce the most important goals of their foreign 
policy to the new president. Due to the Fang Lizhi case the American government 
was willing to respect these. Basically, both parties were satisfied with the meeting 
and it served as the basis of harmonic co-operation in the future. 
 
Tiananmen: violating the principles of Chinese foreign policy 
 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, the ƌesults of Bush͛s ǀisit ǁeƌe sooŶ uŶdeƌŵined by the events on 
Square Tiananmen. Although they were not without any antecedents28, the 
Americans did not expect it. The expert group with the task to deal with Asia was 
not formed yet, ambassador James R. Lilley following Lord in his position was to 
arrive on 2nd May, getting into the middle of the crisis29. The American government 
did not know how to relate to the events, ǁhiĐh is ƌefleĐted ďǇ Bush͛s 
                                                 
25 DENG: China Will Tolerate No Disturbances, March 4, 1989. SWDX, 3. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1950.html (16. 07. 2013). 
26 Deng about Fang Lizhi: „I have read Fang Lizhi's speeches. He doesn't sound like a Communist 
Party member at all. Why do we keep people like him in the Party? He should be expelled, not just 
peƌsuaded to Ƌuit”. DENG: Take a clear-cut stand against bourgeois liberalization, December 30, 1986, 
SWDX, 3. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1630.html (16. 07. 2013).  
27 Aďout the FaŶg Lizhi Đase aŶd it͛s Đonsequences in the leadership of US foreign policy see: 
SEUTTINGER, Robert L.: Beyond Tiananmen: the politics of U.S.-China relations, 1989-2000. Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2003. 25-27. SEUTTINGER (2003). 
28 U.S. Embassy Beijing: Cable Farewell and Hail, April 21, 1989 IN: EVANS (2001): 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB47/doc6.pdf (18. 07. 2013). 
29 TYLER, Patric: A great wall: six presidents and China: an investigate history, PublicAffairs, New 
York, 2000. 343. (TYLER, 2000). 
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announcement on 21st May, one day after the marital law declaration. Bush said 
that he agreed with the goals of the students but they should reach them in a 
peaceful way. „We do support freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom 
of the pƌess aŶd Đleaƌly ǁe suppoƌt deŵoĐƌaĐy. I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to ďe gƌatuitous iŶ 
giǀiŶg adǀiĐe, ďut I ǁould eŶĐouƌage ƌestƌaiŶt. I do Ŷot ǁaŶt to see ďloodshed”30. 
Bush͛s stateŵeŶt ƌefleĐts the faĐt that although theǇ ǁeƌe pƌepaƌed foƌ the ďad 
turn of the events, they tried to avoid any open criticism of the CCP as the 
AŵeƌiĐaŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt did Ŷot ǁaŶt to put the tǁo ĐouŶtƌies͛ good ƌelatioŶship at 
risk and Bush firmly believed that it was the strategic interest of America.  
Still, Bush could not ignore the public opinion. The western television 
ĐoŵpaŶies staǇiŶg iŶ BeijiŶg due to GoƌďaĐheǀ͛s ǀisit ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ ďƌoadĐast the 
happenings, because of which the public followed the events with increasing 
iŶteƌest. Bush͛s Đaƌeful ŵaŶoeuǀƌiŶg is also ƌefleĐted by how he commented on 
the military intervention: „It is clear that the Chinese Government has chosen to 
use force against Chinese citizens who were making a peaceful statement in favour 
of democracy. I deeply deplore the decision to use force against peaceful 
demonstrators and the consequent loss of life. We have been urging – and 
continue to urge – non-violence, restraint, and dialog. Tragically, another course 
has been chosen. Again, I urge a return to non-violent means for dealing with the 
current situation. The United States and People's Republic of China over the past 
two decades have built up through great efforts by both sides a constructive 
relationship beneficial to both countries. I hope that China will rapidly return to the 
path of political and economic reform and conditions of stability so that this 
ƌelatioŶship, so iŵpoƌtaŶt to ďoth ouƌ peoples, ĐaŶ ĐoŶtiŶue its gƌoǁth”31. Bush͛s 
reserved behaviour was deeply condemned by the public, the Congress with its 
Democratic majority and even by a significant part of the Republican Party. The 
Congress demanded immediate sanctions against China, the freezing of military 
and technological transfers, blocking World Bank loan, imposing duties on Chinese 
products, suspending Peace Corp, as well as calling back the American 
ambassador32.  
On 5th June giving in for the public opinion, Bush announced the first sanctions 
which mainly concerned the military field: military relations got suspended, the 
sale of military devices got blocked. Furthermore, Chinese students studying in the 
US were ensured about the immediate and automatic further validation of their 
right of abode. Humanitarian and medical help was promised to the ones who 
                                                 
30 Public Paper: The PƌesideŶt͛s Neǁs CoŶfeƌeŶĐe ǁith PƌesideŶt MitteƌƌaŶd of FƌaŶĐe, May 21, 1989. 
GBPLM http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=438&year=&month= (18. 07. 2013).  
31 Public Paper: StateŵeŶt oŶ the ChiŶese GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s SuppƌessioŶ of studeŶt DeŵoŶstƌatioŶs, 06 
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suffered from retaliation. Finally, he made a promise that the American China-
policy would be thought over after a more exact understanding of the events33.  
The Bush administration took another important step: Fangh asked for 
diplomatic protection at the American embassy in Beijing on 5th June. Although he 
did not take part in the events on Square Tiananmen, he was likely to be arrested 
due to his eaƌlieƌ ƌole. ‘ejeĐtiŶg his ƌeƋuest ǁould haǀe uŶdeƌŵiŶed Bush͛s 
popularity even more so the government said yes, however for fear of the Chinese 
reaction, this was not widely aired to the media. 
The Bush-government intended to calm down the public with some high-
sounding but not to significant sanctions in the hope that it would not do 
considerable harm to the Chinese-American relations. Still, what was the response to 
the American manoeuvring in China? Neither the Congress nor the public was 
satisfied ǁith Bush͛s ďalaŶĐiŶg poliĐǇ aŶd it eǀeŶ tuƌŶed the ChiŶese leadeƌship 
against the US, as a result of which, the relationship with China was suddenly 
broken. As a first sign of this, Bush attempted to get through Deng several times but 
without success34. Later, on 8th June the Chinese papers brought to light the case of 
Fang as a part of propaganda against the US35. Welcoming Fang at the embassy was 
considered as a severe intervention into domestic affairs and clearly hinted at the 
idea that it was the USA that was in the background of the happening on the square. 
It was only on 26th June when an official answer in harsh tone arrived, which 
announced that China also suspended the military relations36.  
AmeƌiĐa ƌeĐeiǀed ChiŶa͛s ƌespoŶse ǁith suƌpƌise. The Bush adŵiŶistƌatioŶ 
thought that the Chinese leadership would understand the sensitivity of the 
situatioŶ foƌ the US goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁould appƌeĐiate Bush͛s ƌole iŶ tƌǇiŶg to Đalŵ doǁŶ 
the public37. However, the Chinese looked at the attempt with different eyes. The 
introduction of the sanctions, welcoming Fang as well as the presence of the 
American media at Square Tiananmen suggested that the USA was intervening in 
Chinese domestic affairs, which meant one of the most sensitive issues of Chinese 
foreign policy. Unintentionally the Bush government reopened an old sore. How up-
to-date the historic comparison was for the Chinese leaders is clearly reflected by 
                                                 
33 Public paper: The PresideŶt͛ s Neǁs CoŶfeƌeŶĐe, June 05, 1989. GBPLM 
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=494&year=&month= (18. 07. 2013).  
34 Public Paper: The PresideŶt͛s Neǁs CoŶfeƌeŶĐe, June 08, 1989, GBPLM. 
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35 About the critics of Chinese media see: KRISTOF, Nicholas D.: Turmoil in China; China Seeks Arrest of Its 
Top Dissident, The New York Times, June 12, 1989. http://www.nytimes.com/1989/ 06/12/world/turmoil-in-
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36 Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, TFCH01: SITREP No 65, 
June 27. IN: RICHELSON, Jeffrey T. & EVANS, Michael L. (ed): Tiananmen Square, 1989: The Declassified 
History, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, 16., 1999. RICHELSON & EVANS (1999): 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/docs/doc33.pdf (18. 07. 2013).  
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Eagleburger, 30 October 1989: State Department document: „Themes”, June 29, 1989. IN: RICHELSON & 
EVANS (1999): http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/docs/doc34.pdf (18. 07. 2013). 
 
 
ÖT KONTINENS, az Új- és JeleŶkoƌi EgǇeteŵes TöƌtéŶeti TaŶszék tudoŵáŶǇos közleŵéŶǇei, No 2013/1. 
ELTE, BUDAPEST, 2014. 
 
207 
DeŶg͛s ǁoƌds oŶ the deĐlaƌatioŶ, aďout the saŶĐtioŶs Đoncerning the sale of arms 
and rethinking the World Bank loan which was accepted on the G7 Paris Summit 
(July 14-16, 1989)38: „I am a Chinese, and I am familiar with the history of foreign 
aggression against China. When I heard that the seven Western countries, at their 
summit meeting, had decided to impose sanctions on China, my immediate 
assoĐiatioŶ ǁas to ϭ9ϬϬ, ǁheŶ the allied foƌĐes of the eight poǁeƌs iŶǀaded ChiŶa.”39 
On top of that, Deng thought that the western intervention in connection with 
Tiananmen was not an isolated case but it was a part of the series of events marking 
the shaking of the Communist Block. In his view, the western countries wanted to 
undermine the socialist world not with military means but with economic and 
political ones, including China, which had earlier been considered as a partner40. So 
China could not be weak and had to resist any western intervention at any cost.41  
However, Deng –as opposed to the conservative side of the CCP- did not want 
to put an end to the relationship with the west because in order to become a great 
power, China needed foreign technology and capital. So on 16th June, 1989 he 
announced before the members of the CCP: „First, economic development should 
not slow down"42 and to achieve this, the opening policy had to continue: „We 
must really carry out reform and open to the outside – we can't do it with our 
doors closed"43. What was the task of China in this situation? Nothing else but to 
wait for the end of the western sanctions. So slowly but surely everything would 
get back to its own track. And to achieve it as soon as possible, western business 
people should be encouraged to invest in the country44.  
The American party realised fairly soon that international isolation was not in the 
interest of China, so they hoped that the relations would be restored soon. However, 
the Bush government was under pressure by the public opinion, so its attempts were 
not successful and were only enough to prevent deepening the crisis by vetoing the 
decisions of the Congress45. Despite the attempts on both sides, restoring the relations 
                                                 
38 Declaration on China, G-7 Summit, July 15, 1989., University of Toronto Library and the G8 
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39 DENG: We are Working to Revitalize the Chinese Nation, April 7, 1990, SWDX, 3. 
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failed. However, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq brought about a new situation which 
provided an opportunity for co-operation and easing tension. 
 
The Gulf War: violation of another Chinese foreign policy principle 
 
At the beginning of the crisis in Kuwait (July), it seemed that China and the US 
were capable of efficient co-operation within the framework of the UN. The two 
great powers agreed that the action of Iraq was illegal46, violating international 
norms47 and that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait at once48. They also shared the 
view on freezing import from Iraq and introducing arms embargo49, as well as 
having a naval blockade50 and international sanctions51.  
Nevertheless, in August the disagreements between the two countries came to 
the surface again. China considered the invasion of Kuwait as a good opportunity 
to aĐt as a gƌeat poǁeƌ, iŵpƌoǀiŶg the iŶteƌŶatioŶal ǀieǁ oŶ the ĐouŶtƌǇ. DeŶg͛s 
statement clearly exemplifies how the Chinese leadership evaluated ChiŶa͛s 
international importance: „The situation in which the United States and the Soviet 
Union dominated all international affairs is changing. Nevertheless, in future when 
the world becomes three-polar, four-polar or five-polaƌ, ;…Ϳ IŶ the so-called multi-
polaƌ ǁoƌld, ChiŶa too ǁill ďe a pole. We should Ŷot ďelittle ouƌ oǁŶ iŵpoƌtaŶĐe”52. 
China was considered an independent great power with its own zone of influence. 
The invasion of Kuwait was seen as a problem of the Third World and they wanted 
to act as a ͛leadeƌ͛. The aim was to solve the conflict at the table to show how 
enlightened methods they had in the field of diplomacy. They did it in the hope of 
the US aŶd its ǁesteƌŶ allies͛ liftiŶg the saŶĐtioŶs agaiŶst ChiŶa. Besides, it ǁould 
have conveyed an important message to the inner opposition of the Chinese 
government showing the international approval of the system. 
The new foreign policy concept of the Bush government with its plan about 
world-wide international co-operation and the so-called New World Order53 was 
absolutely against the Chinese plans. Although Bush and Deng had the same basic 
thought when evaluating the situation, i.e. the weakening of the USSR created a 
new international situation in which there was a chance for several power centres 
in order to take an active role in international politics. However, there was a basic 
difference, namely that Bush did not consider the US as one power centre but as 
                                                 
46 United Nations Security Council resolution 662, adopted on 9 August 1990. 
47 United Nations Security Council resolution 664, adopted unanimously on 18 August 1990. 
48 United Nations Security Council resolution 660, adopted on 2 August 1990. 
49 United Nations Security Council resolution 661, adopted on 6 August 1990. 
50 United Nations Security Council resolution 664, adopted on 18 August 1990. 
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the only superpower above all the others, whose power did not come from 
strength and the principle of divide et imperia, but from the wise co-ordination of 
the states͛ iŶteƌest aŶd theiƌ leadiŶg. As the ďest possiďle ǁaǇ of ĐƌeatiŶg the Neǁ 
World Order, the Bush government decided to organise a military coalition in 
which all the great powers would act together including the weakened USSR as 
well as China and the western powers under American direction. 
Both the American New World Order and the military solution of the crisis in 
Kuwait were opposed by the Chinese leadership from the beginning. As China saw 
it, the New World Order was nothing else but the US guarding the other great 
poǁeƌs, ǁhiĐh ǁould uŶdeƌŵiŶe ChiŶa͛s ƌole iŶ the Thiƌd Woƌld, ǁhiĐh ǁas the 
cornerstone of the foreign policy laid by Deng. On the one hand, the military 
intervention would make it impossible for China to play the mediator roll, which 
was thought to help China break out of its international isolation. On the other 
hand, the military solution was rejected because of its foreign intervention nature, 
which was not surprising with Tiananmen in their mind. 
There were several occasions in November to bring the opposing views closer to 
each other but the parties talked at cross purposes. The American plan54 set a date 
(January 15, 1991) for the withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from Kuwait, after which 
the international community could take even military action. The leadership of the 
USA hoped that China would say yes to this plan so the Chinese Foreign Minister, 
Qian Qichen, was invited to Washington on 30th November, which was welcomed by 
the Chinese. Qian announced his visit to Washington on 26th November and also said 
that it ǁas uŶƌealistiĐ to hope foƌ ChiŶa͛s aĐĐeptaŶĐe of the ŵilitaƌǇ iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ. OŶ 
the very same the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC was informed by the 
American party, that Qian could meet the President on condition that China would 
back the American plan. The Chinese leadership considered this blackmail so they 
also set new conditions. As long as Qian would not be invited by the Americans, 
China would use its right of veto in the UN55. Finally, it did not happen because when 
it came to voting on 29th November56, China decided to abstain, which Bush 
considered betrayal. Despite this, Bush met Qian on 30th November but no 
significant step was taken to put the relations right57. 
After accepting the United Nations Security Council resolution 678, the 
organisation of the international coalition began and military forces appeared. The 
American army of half a million soldiers, the technology and the failure of the 
Chinese diplomacy to take an active role in bringing the UN and Iraq closer to each 
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other, made Deng – who was still very influential but had already stepped down – 
realise in December the hopes of China for the resolution of the conflict in Kuwait 
were not realistic: „Some developing countries would like China to become the 
leader of the Third World. But we absolutely cannot do that - this is one of our 
basic state policies. We can't afford to do it and besides, we aren't strong 
eŶough”58. DeŶg͛s ǀiew, however, was not shared by leadership of the CCP who 
still believed in the possibility of negotiations as in the meantime Russia had re-
evaluated the situation in Iraq due to the lining up of UN forces near its border. 
The Chinese leadership still believed that even if it could not prevent a military 
solution, the US would find itself in a prolonging war like in Vietnam. In this case 
the US would have needed the help of China, which could have ensured the end of 
the arms embargo and the restoration of its role as a great power59. 
However, the Operation Desert Storm lasted only 43 days despite the expectations 
of Chinese leadership (17 January 1991 – 28 February 1991). The Chinese public 
followed the events with intense interest60 as in the first high-tech war in the world the 
US and its allies annihilated the Iraqi army. However, most of the weaponry of the 
annihilated Iraqi army was from China, as it had been the most important arms 
supplier of Iraq since the Iraqi-Iranian War (1980-1988)61. The vantage of the American 
military technique shocked the Chinese leadership and made it obvious that its plans 
aďout takiŶg paƌt iŶ politiĐs as a gƌeat poǁeƌ ǁeƌe ŵeƌe illusioŶ. DeŶg͛s ƌeĐogŶitioŶ 
that China was unable to fulfil the role of being the leader of the Third World was 
proved. Although the country could not be ignored, its weight could not be compared 
to the oŶlǇ supeƌpoǁeƌ of the ǁoƌld, the US. That͛s ǁhǇ it ďeĐaŵe uŶaǀoidaďle to ƌe-
evaluate the doctrine determining the foreign policy of the 1980s. 
 
Collapse of the co-operation and the „loǁ profile” Chinese foreign poliĐy 
 
As a result of the failure in co-operation of the Iraq case and the lack of 
improvement in other fields – human rights, missiles sales to Syria and Pakistan, the 
violation of intellectual property rights, American trade deficit – Bush re-evaluated 
his former China-suppoƌtiŶg poliĐǇ. This ǁas a sigŶifiĐaŶt ĐhaŶge. Bush, the “old 
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fƌieŶd͛ of ChiŶa, gaǀe up ChiŶa, ǁhiĐh deteƌŵiŶed the ƌelatioŶs of the tǁo ĐouŶtƌǇ iŶ 
the rest of his presidency. However Bush vetoed the proposal of the Congress and 
Senate not to renew the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status of China (with also 
considering the economic interests of the US), in September 1992 he announced to 
sell 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan62, which according to the Chinese view was the most 
sensitive interference in Chinese domestic issues. The trust between the two 
countries had reached the lowest level since the normalization of 1972. 
As an answer to the Gulf War and the fell of the communist countries 
thoughtful Eastern-Europe the leadership of the CCP decided to return to isolation 
aŶd giǀe up the ͚OpeŶiŶg up poliĐǇ͛. This ƌesulted iŶ a sloǁiŶg doǁŶ of eĐoŶoŵiĐ 
growth and an increasing budget deficit. Similar to the early Mao-era the Western 
countries and especially the USA became an enemy and a possible military conflict 
came again into consideration. On the contrary Deng by the end of 1991 
unsuccessfully tried to call attention63 to this mistake of the leadership. He worried 
that the isolation and slower growing rate could make it impossible to restore 
ChiŶa͛s positioŶ as a gƌeat poǁeƌ. He set off oŶ his so-called southern tour 
(nanxun) in 1992, during which he visited the special economic zones considered 
as the symbols of his economic policy. In his speech64 Deng defended the ͚OpeŶiŶg 
Up poliĐy͛, suggesting that economic growth had utmost priority. Deng knew that 
maintaining the opening policy would increase the possibility of conflicts between 
China and the Western World, especially the US. Against the continuous 
iŶteƌfeƌeŶĐe iŶto ChiŶa͛s doŵestiĐ issues ChiŶa ǁould haǀe Ŷot affoƌd to Đut the 
relations as the US was a primary important technology and capital exporter. Deng 
drew the attention of the CCP to the importance of not to seek direct conflicts, but 
also not to be afraid of them. He gave up his view of China being the leader of the 
Third World and the active foreign policy, because he realised that the hegemony 
of the US spreads over even to the Third World. This was the introduction of the so 
called „loǁ pƌofile” Chinese foreign policy, which was summarized with twenty-
four Chinese character: Leng Jing Guan Cha, Zhan Wen Jiao Gen, Chen Zhuo Ying 
Fu, Tao Guang Yang Hui, Shan Yu Shou Zhuo, Jue Bu Dang Tou – „Observe calmly; 
secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; 
be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership”65 The „low 
pƌofile” strategy means that China will not take the lead in the international 
society and will not take part in a serious conflict, which would endanger the 
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economic grow. This new foreign policy seemed to be dropping the goals which 
ǁeƌe laid doǁŶ iŶ the ϭϵϴϬ͛s, ďut iŶ the loŶg ƌuŶ the idea of ChiŶa ďeiŶg a ƌule-
maker at international level did not have to be disregarded, simply the right time 
had not come yet.  
DeŶg͛s eǀaluatioŶ of the foƌeigŶ situatioŶ aŶd his ideas ǁeƌe Ŷot aĐĐepted 
immediately by the highest leadership of the CCP. The Fourteen National Congress 
of the CCP held in 12-18 October 1992 meant the defeat of the conservative wing 
of the Party and the return of Deng as a paramount leader. The revised foreign 
concept of Deng, with simultaneously cooperation and sporadic conflicts, 




At the beginning of the Bush era it seemed that the US and China would 
deepen their partner relationship even more. The foreign policy constructed by 
Kissinger and Nixon attributed a bigger role to East-Asian countries than their real 
potentials suggested. Under these circumstances, the paramount leader of the 
CCP Deng Xiaoping set the most important foreign policy goals. Shaking of the 
Communist Block caused changes in international politics, which forced the 
leadership of the US to found its foreign policy on a new basis. Bush͛s Neǁ Woƌld 
Order concept violated many of the principles laid down by Deng and China also 
lost its earlier distinguished status. The Chinese leadership was only able to adopt 
the new situation through shock, which did not mean giving up the original ideas 
but simply realising that the time for implementing their original ideas had not 
Đoŵe Ǉet. The suĐĐess of ChiŶa͛s adaptatioŶ has ďeeŶ pƌoǀed ďǇ the eĐoŶoŵiĐ 
growth of the next decades and its join into some global institutions.  
 
